Chapter IV.

I.

The following chapter is properly a continuation of chapter sixth of the preceding "Memoir on the Dangers and defences of New York City." In that chapter I presented a statement of the theory of defence of New York city from land and naval attacks according to the plans of the Engineer Bureau, together with an analysis, which was elaborated at considerable length, of the properties and influence actually enjoyed by the defensive works already built, or in progress, in conformity with such plans. In that analysis was a certain hiatus. In order to show the insufficiency of the official system of defence in the quarter that was last discussed in that chapter, viz: on Willet's Point side of New York, I deemed it requisite only to state the entire omission, by that system, to place any material impediments in the way of an enemy who should arrive from that quarter, and to allude to the topographical circumstances of what would then become the theater of hostilities, as sufficient reason for doubting the ability of any strategical* plans based on the Willet's Point fort to supply such deficiency. It appears to me that military men would understand the situation and the allusion, and that consequently it would be superfluous trouble to extend the analysis so as to demonstrate the correctness of a conclusion which I believed would be granted by such readers; and I apprehend that a discussion on strategical moves would be found tedious and obscure to general readers, on whose common sense I was content to rely. My confidence in the latter regard has been justified, as appeared by the readiness displayed by the press of New York (as well as several other cities) in seizing and appreciating the ideas sought to have been impressed. But in regard to professional critics, my confidence proved to have been misplaced. These would seem to have misapprehended my remarks on this head, and apparently attributed my not dilating upon it, and supporting my conclusions in regard to it, to some want of correctness in the latter. Such are my reasons for introducing here a complete, though concise, exposition of the arguments which bear upon the said contested question, viz: the

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* The propriety of classing as strategical the supposed operations upon Long Island is questionable. According to the definitions of Bulow and of Lieutenant General Scott, strategy has reference to operations that take place on a scale that prevents their being embraced in the field of vision of the general in command. From the vicinity of Willet's Point, transporting ourselves along the hills to the observatory on Cypress Hill cemetery, in the vicinity of East New York, a panoramic view can be had of the entire field that would be embraced by the operations on both sides, in case of a hostile landing being effected on Long Island to eastward of Rockaway or Willet's Point; and from Ocean Hill, in Greenwood cemetery, a similar view is had of the bays of Jamaica and Gravesend; and of Coney Island, and of the theater of hostilities generally that would correspond with a landing in Jamaica bay or westward of that place. Hence it might be proper to avoid the use of the term strategy in discussing the problem of the defence of New York and Brooklyn; but my meaning will probably be understood without the necessity of attending to the niceties of military definitions, by attaching too much importance to which a writer is apt to be led into error in his application of theory.

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