Chapter III.

As it might possibly seem to the reader that I have attempted to draw general conclusions from the events of the campaign of 1859 in Italy, and the probable manner in which it might have been conducted had hostilities not ceased when they did, I will suggest, as subjects of reflection and aids in divining the true interpretation of the military portents of the present day, two of the campaigns of Napoleon I, in which the situations, as regards topography and political and military circumstances, are of a character distinct with those of the former and of each other— I refer to the campaigns of Moscow, and of Eylau and Friedland.

Let us suppose that the war of 1854-56, between France and England combined and Russia, were to be revived, and that an invasion of the latter country were determined upon with a view to gaining possession of its capital as a primary object; and let us weigh the chances of success of properly combined military and naval operations for that purpose in the Baltic and in the Gulfs of Livonia and Finland, including the capture of Riga and Revel, and a march from the latter point, as a base, upon St. Petersburg.

The military difficulties that Napoleon I had to contend with in his invasion of that country of 1812 arose from three causes: the excessive distances over which his magazines had to be transported, the magnitude of the preparations of all kinds required by the number of his troops, and the poverty of the invaded provinces in horses, on shelter for the troops, in forage, and in provisions. It is said that no less than 20,000 vehicles of all sorts followed the march of the "grand army;" thirty-four battalions of drivers were organized, each of which comprised 150 baggage wagons, with four horses each; twenty of these battalions, which carried 4,000,000 rations, a fifteen days' supply, followed the army. The magazines had been accumulated at Dantzic, Warsaw, and intermediate places, and immense numbers of cattle bought in Poland and Galicia; and immediately on occupying Wilna measures were taken to forward all the stores at Dantzic to that place, by way of Konigsberg, the Niemen, and the Wilia, by water transportation.

During the march to the Nieman each brigade and division, which was accompanied by its own train, provided itself with supplies from the different magazines. But all these precautions and arrangements proved unavailing. The march of the troops had to be accelerated in order to concentrate beyond the Vistula, immediately upon Alexander's hostile intentions being perceived, and in order the trains should keep up the horses were driven. The roads were bad, and the scanty forage consisted principally of green grain. Great numbers of the animals perished before arriving at the Nieman, and soon after the torrents of rain and the ruined condition of the roads destroyed most of those which remained.

The French found some resources in the Russian magazines, which they sometimes succeeded in rescuing from the destruction they were

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