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Introduction I As a preface or rather index to the contents of this memoir, the following sketch of its outline is submitted. It may also be useful as a clue to some parts where the general drift has been rather lost sight of, in order to explore certain collateral issues, and so may correct what might otherwise be an imperfect arrangement, which was unavoidably requires by my main design, viz: of examining each governing element of modern warfare, not only as regards its integral nature and general bearing on the rest and on the theory of war, but with the view of determining its special and its comparative importance in the individual problem treated of in my "Memoir on the Dangers and Defences of New York City," of which this essay may be said to contain, among other matter, the sequel or complement. II. The subject of sea-coast defence is examined analytically, beginning with a treatment of that branch of it which is comprehended in all measures available for resisting invasion by means of hostile armies conveyed to our shores in fleets of transports and men-of-war, by steam power. It is shown that the facilities possessed by England and France for throwing vast bodies of troops upon the coast of a State with which either or both by be at war, introduce such radical innovations into the art of war as to require a thorough remodeling of all the hitherto recognized applications of the maxims of strategy. In my treatment of this item of investigation I have avoided generalities of all kinds. I regard general rules as pernicious to the proper practice of warfare, in which peculiar circumstances are found, in nearly every case that occurs in practice, to render it an exception, to which such rules are inapplicable in a greater or less degree. For this reason, and because in exploring a new sphere of military art I am conscious of my incapacity, I prefer to embody all my reflections, in regard to the limits of the revolution in warfare which is indicated by the events of the past six months and the portents of the present time, in the discussion of several particular examples. One advantage must result from that method, viz: that if my prognostications are deemed erroneous by the reader, he has every facility to investigate the reasoning and data they are founded on, and to draw his own conclusions. III. The military events selected as themes in the first chapter are those of the recent Italian war, and those which seemed, just before
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